This papers analyses the causes behind Africa's unfortunate transformation into the source of the world's slaves over the early modern period. We discuss the economic and technological forces leading to it, and address questions such as why were most slave buyers Europeans and most slave sellers Africans. We then relate the discussion to the long-term determinants of African underdevelopment, and argue for the role of biogeography as an ultimate explanatory factor of Africa's past slave trade and its current economic situation.
Introduction
Starting from the middle of the 17th century, Africa was the scene of a socioeconomic phenomenon the likes of which the world had never seen before and will surely never see again. Large parts of the continent, from the Senegal river to the high plateau of Angola, became specialized in the capture, distribution, and selling of slaves. In the words of Martin A. Klein, Economics, University of Glasgow. Adam Smith Building, Glasgow G12 8RT, UK. Tel: +44 141 330 8517. Email: luis.angeles@glasgow.ac.uk .
"slave trading and slave production became the most important economic activities for many African states" (Klein 2003, p.504) .
Slavery was of course as ancient as the …rst large civilizations. More than four thousand years ago ancient Egypt and Akkadian Mesopotamia made very large use of slave labour (Higman 1998) . Since then, slavery has existed in some form or another in most if not all human societies until the late 19th century. In some cases, such as ancient Rome or the Muslim world, slaves were ubiquitous: they performed a variety of menial tasks in the households of the wealthy, rendered services in commerce and public administration, served in the army, and worked as raw labour in the mines and in large plantations. In other cases, such as China and India, slavery was only a marginal feature of society (Manning 1990, p. 28) .
Slaves had come from Africa since ancient times, but Africa was far from being the only source of slaves. Indeed, Greeks and Romans had slaves whose origins laid all over Europe, the Middle East and Africa, while the Muslim world imported slaves from Eastern Europe, Africa and Central Asia. The three centuries that followed the beginning of Europe's maritime expansion saw Africa becoming practically the only source for the world's slaves.
Several aspects set the African slave trade of the early modern period apart, starting with its magnitude. This was essentially the consequence of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, which took a total of 12.5 million Africans to the Americas in its three and a half centuries of existence. Africa became a land where the possibility of enslavement was pervasive. A recent calculation estimates that for the West and West Central coasts of Africa the probability of being sent as a slave to the Americas at some point during one's lifetime was an astonishing 9.3 percent during the period 1701-1850 (Whatley and Gillezeau 2011) . And the impact of slavery on Africans' lives was even higher than what that …gure suggests. First, Whatley and Gillezeau (2011) assume a constant probability of enslavement over a lifetime; but very few children were sent as slaves to the Americas. Among working-age adults the probability would have been easily twice as high. Second, do-mestic slavery expanded in tandem with slave exports. Klein (2003, p.504) , for instance, states that "It is probable that in western Africa during the eighteenth century, as many slaves were kept as were exported, as a result of increased availability and increased social di¤erentiation". Finally, a considerable share of the people captured in slave raids died during their transport to the coast and while waiting to be bought -so that every slave exported represented more than one person captured. 1 While the Muslim world had been importing African slaves since its earliest days, the magnitude of this trade was relatively stable at between 5,000 and 10,000 persons per year since the 10th century (Lovejoy 1983, This di¤erent order of magnitude required a di¤erent system for ensuring the capture and supply of slaves; this was another feature that set the African slave trade apart. Up to this point in history, slaves were a traditional by-product of wars -a convenient source of revenues but not the main motive for starting an armed con ‡ict in the …rst place. Alternative methods of obtaining slaves were not unknown but of relatively little importance. 3 This changed in Africa. Wars were increasingly fought with the sole objective of obtaining slaves, and they became more common (Lovejoy 1983, chapter 4) . And new methods of obtaining slaves became increasingly widespread: kidnapping and raiding, enslavement by judicial process, enslavement as a consequence of debts, and so on. Slavery became a central feature of many African societies.
Since the phenomenon of the African slave trade appears to be quite unique in history, it is perhaps not surprising that recent research has linked it to Africa's other sorrowful claim to distinctiveness: its dismal record in terms of economic development. The path-breaking work of Nunn (2008) , who put together an estimate of the total exports of slaves from every African country to the di¤erent Eurasian buyers, shows a strong negative relationship between exports of slaves and current levels of economic development.
Slave trading may handicap future economic development because the multiplication of small-scale wars and raids that characterized it lead to higher levels of ethnic fractionalization and lower levels of interpersonal trust. 4 The objective of the present paper is to o¤er an explanation for the development of the African slave trade over the three and a half centuries following the year 1500. If recent results in the literature are right in pointing towards Africa's history as a cause of its lack of economic development, then an understanding of why the hugely disrupting slave trade of the early modern period took place in Africa and not somewhere else in the world 3 An example would be the trade in Slavic people from Russia and Eastern Europe to Muslim lands, where the Varangian overlords obtained the slaves mainly through tribute (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007, p.76) . 4 See Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (forthcoming) for evidence on this. The link between ethnic fractionalization and economic development, and interpersonal trust and economic development, have been recognized previously in the literature (see Levine 1997, Knack and Keefer 1997 , and the subsequent literature).
should be high on the economists'and economic historians'agendas. As we document below, the literature is actually sparse in explanations and should bene…t from contributions like the present one.
After discussin the slave trade, the paper extends the discussion into the long-term determinants of Africa's current economic development. The role of biogeographic factors is stressed both as an ultimate determinant of the slave trade and, through that channel, as an essential element in our understanding of Africa's present circumstances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o¤ers a literature review highlighting how economists and economic historians have explained slavery and the slave trade. Weaknesses are identi…ed in the available explanations, thus the need to advance less imperfect ones. Section 3 begins with that task by delineating the main economic forces at play in the slave trade between Europe and Africa. Sections 4 and 5 extend the discussion by addressing two important questions: (i) Why were most slave buyers Europeans (and not from elsewhere in Eurasia)? and (ii) Why were almost all slaves African? Section 6 extends the discussion to consider the role of biogeography in the context of the slave trade, and links the subject with the long-term economic development of Africa. Section 7 o¤ers a formal model that summarizes in a simple form many of the previous discussions, and the last section of the paper o¤ers some concluding remarks.
A literature review
It seems quite remarkable that, having originated from all over the world throughout history, slaves increasingly became of African origin over the early modern period. Why, indeed, was Africa and not somewhere else in the world the source of the world's slaves?
Economic reasons are likely to …gure prominently when addressing this question, for material pro…t can be clearly detected as the main motivation for the trade on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans were in need of labour for their highly pro…table sugar plantations. African slaves became the solution for Europe's labour needs in the Americas for simple yet irresistible economic reasons: they were about two times cheaper than European indentured labour (which was in quite limited supply anyway) and at least four times cheaper that what European free labor would have cost. 5 Meanwhile, on the African side of the Atlantic, Europeans found that they did not need to bother with military excursions to the interior of the continent in order to obtain slaves. Africans took care of the raids and the capturing themselves and brought the resulting slaves to the ports and markets where Europeans and Muslims could buy them without further e¤ort. Africans were persuaded to enslave and sale other Africans by the millions through the considerable rents to be gained by doing so. Evans and Richardson (1995) report that slaves were sold to European buyers for £ 30-£ 32 at the beginning of the 19th century, while prices for slaves in Africa's domestic market were in the £ 12-£ 20 range; a markup of at least 50% over the local price.
While the immediate reasons for the development of the African slave trade were the price di¤erences just mentioned, it is not obvious why only Africa got involved in the massive export of slaves. We can easily dismiss a simple geographic explanation based on transport costs (Africa is far closer to the Caribbean than any region in Asia) by noting that Indian textiles formed a very large component of the goods that Europeans exchanged in Africa against slaves (Inikori 1992, p. 175 . European textiles eventually replaced Indian ones, but not before the Industrial Revolution). Thus, Europeans were incurring the cost of going all the way from Europe to India and back to Africa in order to buy slaves there. If transport costs had been paramount, buying the slaves in India would have been a superior alternative.
5 Appendix 1 o¤ers some calculations in this respect. The point was made early on by Eric Williams in his seminal work on slavery in the Caribbean when he remarked that "The reason [for slavery in the Caribbean] was economic, not racial; it had to do not with the color of the laborer, but the cheapness of the labor" (Williams 1944, p.19) .
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, very few explanations have been advanced for the causes of the African slave trade. The economic analysis of slavery has developed into a rich and voluminous literature, but most of the attention has been focused on slavery in the Americas -with the question of the pro…tability of slave plantations in the Southern United States taking a prominent place. 6 The best-know theoretical contribution on the causes leading to the rise or fall of slavery within a country is probably Domar (1970) . 7 Domar's thesis is simply that slavery develops in land-abundant regions as a mechanism allowing the creation of rents for the land-owning elite. As population grows and the marginal productivity of labor decreases, slavery becomes unnecessary as the elite will be able to secure cheap labor inputs through the market. The idea has some problems …tting the empirical evidence: as Domar (1970) himself admitted, the great depopulation that followed the Black Death should have led to slavery in Europe -it didn't. The one instance of comprehensive empirical testing to which the theory has been subjected ended up rejecting it (Patterson 1977) . The most fundamental reason for seeking beyond Domar's model, however, is that it ultimately does not relate to slavery at all.
The phenomenon that Domar (1970) was trying to explain was the rise and fall of serfdom in Russia -with some extensions to the rest of Europe.
But most experts on slavery would make a clear distinction between slavery and serfdom -even if some similarities are no doubt present. As Finley (1980, p.299) put it, "Societies have never been reluctant to reduce substantial sections of their own people to debt bondage, serfdom, and the rest, but I know of no society that has tolerated the enslavement, at home, of its own people". Domar's thesis may (or may not) be a useful way of understanding how some members of a society lose important rights -particularly the 6 Seminal works in this area are Conrad and Meyer (1958) and Fogel and Engerman (1974) .
7 Domar (1970) cited Nieboer (1900) as the source of his ideas. For a more recent theoretical treatment along the same lines see Lagerlof (2009). right of free movement to seek a better remuneration for their work. Serfs lacked that right, but they did enjoy a number of other rights which were traditionally upheld in society: they could have a family, own property, and were not sold other than as part of the land. Slaves had none of those rights and were at the complete mercy of their master.
The literature on slavery has developed the concept of slaves as "outsiders" to societies (Finley 1980) . Slavery has always been seen as a status reserved for foreigners, for those who do not belong to one's own people.
This goes as far as having the same word to refer to a slave as to a person from a foreign country, as was the case for ancient Sumer (Isaac 1998) .
Serfs were inside the social realm -even if at its bottom -whereas slaves were always outside of it. An explanation other than Domar's becomes thus necessary. 8 Turning towards the more historical side of the literature, a certain number of potential explanations can be identi…ed. Philip D. Curtin has made the point that Africans' relative resistance to tropical diseases such as malaria and yellow fever made them preferable for the climate of sugarproducing regions (Curtin 1968 (Curtin , 1977 . The point is well-taken, as 19th century data shows overall mortality rates for Africans in the Caribbean of about 40 per one thousand as against rates ranging from 85 to 138 per one thousand for Europeans in the same region (Curtin 1968 , tables 1 and 3). A crucial point, however, is that the disease environment of colonial America was in fact man-made; the outcome of voluntary and forced migrations.
Human populations develop resistance to germs and diseases endemic to their own environment but are greatly vulnerable to germs from places with which they have little or no contact. Nowhere has this been of more consequence than in the Americas, where Old World's diseases reduced the aboriginal population by two-thirds according to conservative estimates (Mad-dison 2005, p. 31) -and by 95% according to less conservative ones (Mann 2005) . The diseases that a-icted Europeans in the sugar-producing regions of the Americas were not local: they came originally from Africa. Up to the 17th century, Africa's malaria and yellow fever had never spread beyond the Sahara since the mosquitoes on which they rely for transmission can only survive in tropical environments. It was the arrival of African slaves in the Americas that brought these diseases and turned the Caribbean and neighboring tropical lands into high mortality areas for Europeans. We would thus advance that the di¤erent mortality rates identi…ed by Curtin were a consequence, not a cause, of the African slave trade. 9 We do not go much further by noting that Europe's colonies in the Caribbean satis…ed the three preconditions for a slave society as put forward by Moses I. Finley: "private ownership of land", "a su¢ cient development of commodity production and markets", and "the unavailability of an internal labour supply" (Finley 1980, p. 86) . Yes, the Caribbean in the 17th century was a likely candidate for slave imports, but why only from Africa and why in such unprecedented numbers? Similarly, Jack Goody's observation that "slavery involves external as well as internal inequality, an unequal balance of power between peoples", and that such external inequality "has been especially common where states existed side by side with zones inhabited by 'uncontrolled', stateless or tribal peoples" (Goody 1980, p.24 ) is of limited use for us. Europeans were precisely not side by side with Africans, they chose to pay the price of travelling there to get their slaves, and the relationship between European and African states was not one of dominance (Thornton 1998 ).
An explanation of the African slave trade that has achieved a certain degree of acceptance was put forward a couple of decades ago by Patrick Manning in his 1990 monograph "Slavery and African Life". Manning (1990) argues that Africans'low productivity in agriculture, a consequence of Africa's less advanced agricultural technology (hoe-based instead of the plow-based agriculture of Eurasia), o¤ered important arbitrage possibilities. In short, Europeans could o¤er to buy a slave for more than the value of its production, and the deal would be pro…table for both parts since African slaves would be put to work using European technology.
Although apparently intuitive, the argument does not survive a careful analysis. The main problem with Manning's thesis is that if the productivity of agricultural labour was higher in Europe than in Africa it would have been pro…table to buy African slaves and put them to work in the European countryside, something that was completely absent over the early modern period. The same would apply to many other regions in Eurasia which were also using the more advanced plow-based agriculture. Sociocultural factors aside, this did not happen because labour productivity in African agriculture was most likely not lower than labour productivity in Eurasia.
There is indeed no contradiction between the (well-established) fact that African agriculture was less technologically advanced than its Eurasian counterpart and the claim that labour productivity was similar in both regions.
Labour productivity, the marginal change in total production due to an increase of labour, depends not only on technology but on the availability of all factors of production such as land, capital and labour itself. A long-standing theme among economic historians of Africa is precisely its relative labour scarcity and the large abundance of land, a fact that was clearly re ‡ected on the land-intensive choice of techniques such as slash-and-burn agriculture and very long periods of fallow. Land abundance could then compensate for a less advanced agricultural technology.
The situation is best understood from the perspective of the Malthusian model. As is well known, Malthusian forces transform technological advances into larger populations -leaving production per capita unchanged because of decreasing returns in the presence of a …xed factor of production, in this case land. We would thus advance that the labour scarcity that economic historians have always emphasized in Africa was an endogenous response to the less advanced agricultural technology of the continent (and, we may add, to the constraints that climate and the availability of plants and animals imposed).
Empirical evidence on labour productivity in agriculture for pre-colonial Africa is essentially inexistent 10 , but good indirect evidence can be found in the literature on human heights as a measure of economic well-being. If labour productivity in agriculture is interpreted as the real wage in terms of agricultural goods, higher labour productivity in agriculture would translate into a better-nourished, and thus taller, population. Good information on the height of di¤erent African ethnic groups is given in Eltis (1990, The data refers to African-born slaves, which is the best we can do given the absence of any statistical data in pre-colonial Africa. The simple average height of the 21 groups listed is 163.89 cm. This is very much in line with average heights from all over Eurasia for the pre-industrial period. Clark cm.). 11 There is thus no reason to think that Africa's labour productivity in agriculture was lower than in any of the advanced civilizations of Eurasia.
An additional problem with Manning's explanation is that it does not take into account the costs of acquiring slaves. A landlord or king selling his peasants into slavery would perhaps just compare the price he is being o¤ered with the loss of agricultural production that the peasant's departure would entail. That, however, is not an accurate description of how the slave trade actually took place. As emphasized above, slaves were outsiders, so slave traders had to procure them from societies other than their own.
Such an operation was costly: slave raids or wars had to be organized, the captives had to be transported, and they had to be fed -however badlyuntil the moment of the sale. Africans would have never exported slaves if the trade had not been pro…table. These costs thus signi…ed a constraint on the minimum price that slave buyers had to pay, and the analysis of the slave trade would be incomplete if we fail to consider them.
Explaining the African slave trade: basic economics
To be fair to Manning, he does have his intuition right in stating that "The logic of African supply of slaves depends, therefore, on the notion that slaves in the New World were more productive than free producers in Africa, with a margin large enough that New World slave owners could pay for the costs of transportation, mortality, and seasoning of their slaves" (Manning 1990, p.33-34) . He was wrong, however, in assuming that these arbitrage opportunities were the consequence of labour productivity in agriculture; continuing with the previous quote: "As long as African agricultural technology, constricted by the limits of the hoe, was trapped at a level of productivity below that of Europeans, European buyers were able to pay consistently more than the value of an African person's produce at home".
Europeans were indeed able to make a pro…t buying African slaves, but this was because African slaves were bought almost exclusively against European manufactures 12 , and the relative price of manufactured goods in terms of agricultural goods was much lower in Europe than in Africa. In short, we must consider at least two sectors in the economy in order to understand why Africa was exporting slaves.
African slaves were employed by Europeans in the production of sugar, tobacco and cotton in American plantations. The value of their production in terms of manufactured goods, exchanged at European relative prices, comfortably exceeded the amount of manufactured goods they could have procured in Africa by working in agriculture or, for that matter, in man-
ufacturing. An arbitrage opportunity thus existed thanks to the relative cheapness of manufactures in Europe; a consequence of Europe's higher productivity in the industrial sector.
As was the case in agriculture, Europe was well in advance of Africa in most or all industrial technologies. 13 In textile production, by far the largest industrial sector of any economy up to the 19th century, Africans used the dista¤ for spinning and simple looms for weaving, but had not adopted the spinning wheel -which spread throughout Eurasia during the Middle Ages and removed the main bottleneck in textile production. Marchetti (1979) mentions that the spinning wheel "speeded up by a factor of 10 or perhaps 100" the production of thread. The advent of the Industrial Revolution in England would of course broaden Europe's advantage by an additional order of magnitude.
In transport technologies Africans were also very limited: there were no vessels capable of long-distance travel, navigation was circumscribed to inland waters and short trips along the coast. The wheel had not been adopted, there were no pack animals except in the Sahel and transportation relied mainly on human porterage.
The one sector where Africans had been at some point in history at a similar level of sophistication as Eurasians was metallurgy. Although Africa did not experience a bronze age, its transition to iron making was relatively early (around 500 BC). Initially Africans'iron smelting was on a par with most of what Eurasia could o¤er, although their forging process was not as sophisticated. Over time, however, Africa's iron technology stalled and by the pre-modern period iron bars had become an important item that Europeans exchanged for African slaves.
1 3 This paragraph and the next two are based on Austen and Headrik (1983). This technological retard was not counterbalanced by Malthusian forces, as was the case in agriculture. The Malthusian model works in full swing in agriculture due to the …xity of land, whereas capital -the counterpart of land in industrial production -is inde…nitely expandable given time and resources. Thus, while African farmers managed to feed themselves as well as Eurasian ones did (although at lower population densities), all indicates that the consumption of manufactured products in Africa was much below Eurasian standards, and that some manufactured goods such as …rearms
were not available at all.
Readers familiar with standard trade theory would observe that such a situation simply implies a comparative advantage for Europe in manufactures against a comparative advantage for Africa in agricultural products.
Most African agricultural products, however, were not tradable over long distances during the early modern period due to their low value per unit of mass or volume (unlike the valuable spices of the East and the sugar or tobacco from the Americas). If Africa wanted to buy European manufactures it had to o¤er a product that could be pro…tably transported overseas.
Gold …tted the bill but its production was geographically limited and could not be easily increased. Slaves, which could be "produced" anywhere in the continent in enormous quantities, became the export of choice.
The possibility of engaging into this exchange between European manufactures and African slaves was long inhibited by the lack of direct contact between the two regions. With Europe's maritime expansion of the early modern period this trade became possible, giving rise to the Trans-Atlantic slave trade.
Why Europe (and not the Muslim world, India or China)?
If the above discussion has shed some lights on why Africa became the source of the world's slaves from the 16th century onwards, insightful readers will have noticed that it also induces additional questions that we address in this and the following section.
A …rst questionrelates to the identity of the slave buyers. The contrast between a technologically advanced Europe and a technologically backward Africa could very well be rephrased by changing the word "Europe" for "Muslim world", "India" or "China". Europe, after all, was not the clear technological leader of Eurasia before the Industrial Revolution. The spinning wheel, for instance, was not a European invention -it originated either in India or China (Temple 1986?) .Cotton textiles and porcelaine were two manufacturing products that Europeans learned to produce only at the beginning of the 18th century by copying, respectively, the Indian and the Chinese. Why didn't any of these other advanced civilizations, all of which had the capacity of sending merchant ships to Africa (and in the case of the Chinese, a whole Armada 14 ), develop the African slave trade before -or at least together with -the Europeans?
The answer to this question suggests itself by looking at the only nonEuropean region to engage in the African slave trade in considerable numbers, the Muslim world. African slaves were employed in Muslim lands in the military, as administrators and, perhaps most important, in domestic service and as concubines (Lovejoy 1983, p. 15) . Africans were usually not employed as a form of raw labour, with the exception of mining. There are only a few examples of African slaves being used in agricultural production.
This last observation is actually valid for all of Eurasia. Having employed agricultural slave labour in large numbers during Roman times, Europe had turned away from that mode of production during the early Middle Ages.
China and India never saw a large number of slaves engaged in agriculture.
The most likely reason for this has been alluded before: all advanced preindustrial societies in Eurasia had in place a social structure that tied peasants to the land and guaranteed cheap labour. Slaves were not needed when serfs (or their equivalent) were available to work the land. With the largest economic sector of pre-industrial times having no role for slave labour, the demand for slaves never took o¤ before the 16th century.
The unprecedented growth in the European demand for African slaves was a result of the development of Europe's sugar industry, with tobacco and cotton playing an additional role. Sugar was particularly well-placed for the use of slaves as no special skills had to be learned, it required a combination of raw labour and capital in its production. 15 But sugar had come to Europe from the East, its re…ning process was probably invented in India sometime before the year 500 AD from where it spread to Muslim lands and China before …nally reaching Europe after the eight century (Mintz 1985, p. 23 ).
Thus, while none of the regions of Eurasia had a need for African slaves in their traditional agriculture, all of Eurasia was familiar with sugar. Why were Europeans the only ones to employ African slaves by the millions in its production?
The reason was not a lack of demand for sugar outside Europe. Sugar was a luxury item, but this was true everywhere in the Eurasian continent.
Taking China as an example, Mazumdar (1998, p. 49) estimates the per capita consumption of sugar in pre-industrial China at 2 pounds per year, roughly in line with that of France at 2.2 pounds per year. British consumption per capita by the year 1800 was nine times this level (Mintz 1985, p. 67) , but Britain's population being only about 6% of the overall European population, the e¤ect was likely to be limited. Indeed, Mazumdar (1998) advances that the total production of sugar in China was about the same (roughly 250,000 tons per year) as the entire output of sugar reaching the world market in the year 1800, which we may equate to Europe's consumption. 
Why only Africa?
The second question is related to a problem already mentioned when discussing Manning's explanation for the African slave trade. In short, slave production had a cost in terms of raids or wars, transportation and storage.
The exchange of slaves for manufactures is a pro…table business only if it covers the costs of slave production.
Another way to approach the question is by asking why slaves came only India, in particular, saw its industrial output fall by almost three quarters during the 19th century due to the import of British manufactures (Bairoch 1982) . It seems valid to ask why this huge level of imports was never paid with Indian slaves.
The answer, we believe, lies in the di¤erent costs of obtaining slaves across di¤erent societies. But claiming that slaves were easier to obtain in Africa than in India or Asia just begs the question of why that would be the case. To address this issue we need to step outside purely economic costs such as equipping an army or feeding the captives since these were in all likelihood similar throughout the Old World. We therefore propose to analyze the cultural aspects that made slave rading less costly in Africa.
Our point of departure is the observation, already made in the preceding section, that societies did not enslave their own members but reserved this meanest of status for outsiders. In the words of Finley (1980, p.143) , "... the slave was always a deracinated outsider -an outsider …rst in the sense that he originated from outside the society into which he was introduced as a slave, second in the sense that he was denied the most elementary of social bonds, kinship".
The concept of an outsider is a cultural one, we regard as outsider someone who behaves di¤erently, talks a di¤erent language, or prays to di¤erent gods. External appearance, what geneticists would call phenotypic di¤er-ences, do not seem to have played a major role in determining who was liable to enslavement throughout history. Ancient Greeks and Romans felt equally inclined to enslave all barbarians, whether from neighboring Mediterranean regions or from across the Sahara, and Muslims acquired slaves from most regions they were in contact with.
The argument that we would like to put forward here is that the capture and trade of slaves was a less costly activity within Africa because of this continent's larger degree of cultural fragmentation. By this we mean that cultural areas, regions within which people would share some essential cultural elements, were smaller in Africa as compared to Eurasia. As a result, people within Africa were much more likely to see each other as "outsiders" than people within any of Eurasia's major regions.
How this translated into lower costs for obtaining slaves is not di¢ cult to see. Let us assume that the enslaving of "insiders" was completely forbidden in all societies -so that would-be slave traders need to run operations against societies seen as distinct from their own. Eurasia's large cultural areas meant that this required long-distance operations and large-scale military actions, rendering the capture of slaves very costly. Africa's cultural fragmentation, on the other hand, implied that raids of even a few dozen men attacking villages from a nearby region would be a cheap and acceptable way to obtain slaves.
It is impossible to calculate a measure of cultural fragmentation for precolonial Africa, but present-day measures clearly show Africa's more divided cultural landscape. Fearon (2003) , for instance, estimates cultural fractionalization by using linguistic distance as a proxy for cultural distance and …nds that average scores in Africa are the highest in the world. And as is well-know since Easterly and Levine (1997) , the related concept of ethnic fractionalization is particularly strong in Africa. Further evidence in support of Africa's distinctively high cultural fragmentation comes from analyzing the causes behind it, an exercise to which we turn in what follows.
In short, we advance that Eurasia's comparatively large cultural areas are the result of two mutually reinforcing structures that have proved particularly e¢ cient in giving vast and disparate peoples a common cultural background: the state and religion.
States are powerful forces for the spread of cultural elements from their core to the areas they conquer. Even short-lived empires could have longlasting consequences on the culture of large areas: Alexander's empire did not survive his death in 323 BC but Greek culture was hugely in ‡uential from Egypt to Bactria for centuries to come. The Greek language became the lingua franca of western Asia and non-Greek cities such as Alexandria were home to some of the most brilliant intellectual achievements of Greek civilization. All of Eurasia's great empires, Rome, China or the Ummayadd Caliphate, spread cultural elements through the provinces they conquered.
But the most radical consequence of state formation in our present context may not be on the cultural practices of the elites but on the everyday life of the common people. Sub-state political entities such as bands, tribes and chiefdoms encompassed a limited number of people and were in a constant state of warfare with each other. States, on the other hand, have an interest in ensuring a certain level of internal peace -if for no other reason than to guarantee the production on which taxes depend (Olsson 2000) and to better direct violence towards external enemies. Charles Tilly has made the point that, on a millennia perspective, deaths due to homicides (i.e. at the hands of civilians) have decreased enormously -and advances the rise of the state as a cause (Tilly 1990, p.67-68) . It is thus the case that a given population of, say, a few million people, would experience much less internal violence if ruled by a single state than by a number of chieftancies or tribes. In support of the above arguments, consider that the enslavement of people became increasingly rare in Eurasia over the …rst 15 centuries of our era while slavery was a fundamental characteristic of African societies up until the arrival of the Europeans (and independently of the earlier trade to Muslim lands). As summarized by Thornton (1998, p. 97) If we try to push the causal linkages even further, we may wonder about the reasons leading Africa into a situation where the expansion of the slave trade seemed almost a natural outcome. Why, …rst of all, was Africa's technology in retard with respect to that of Eurasia? And even allowing for that, why did large regions of Africa -or even the whole continent -never become uni…ed under a large empire or a major religion?
An answer to these questions is likely to require a very long term perspective on the economic development of African, and indeed human, societies.
Africa's distinctiveness in the year 1500 AD was not the result of a few centuries but rather of several millennia. By that point in history empires and world religions had risen and fallen several times in Eurasia, whereas similar developments in Africa were much more modest.
Although we do not claim to settle this question here, a good starting point appears to be the di¤erences in biology, geography and climate between Africa and Eurasia. The best exponent of this line of argument is perhaps Jared Diamond, as exempli…ed in his well-know 1997 monograph "Guns, Germs, and Steel. The Fates of Human Societies". Diamond's thesis is that the long-run economic development of societies around the world was heavily conditioned by the biological and geographical endowments of each region.
Eurasia was lucky because it was richly endowed in domesticable plants and animals which could support an agricultural civilization. Geography meant that the di¤erent elements of this winning biological package, …rst discovered in the Fertile Crescent and China, were able to travel east and west within Eurasia and spread their bene…ts. In comparison, Africa was double unlucky: it had very few plants and animals that could sustain an agricultural society and its tropical climate meant that it could not import Eurasia's superior lot. As a consequence Africa's transition to agriculture took place later and was more limited in its outcomes 1920 . Although Diamond's thesis is persuasive when it comes to agricultural development, additional arguments are required if we wish to link biological endowments and climatic characteristics to developmental outcomes outside agriculture such as manufacturing technology or the existence of states. We turn to such arguments in what follows.
While the productivity of the agricultural sector does not directly constraint technological improvements in other areas of the economy, it does constraint total population under a Malthusian regime. At the level of large regions or continents, a larger population is likely to result in technological progress for reasons that are clear for readers familiar with the endogenous growth literature: more people means more potential inventors and a larger pool of resources that can be invested in research and development. We know since Kremer (1993) that, on a global perspective and over the very long run, economic growth has been proportional to total population. In short, Africa's less productive agriculture created less surpluses to maintain a vigorous and inventive urban sector that could develop the industries.
And the consequences of a less productive agriculture and a smaller population do not stop there. Diamond himself argues that "the size of the regional population is the strongest single predictor of societal complexity" (Diamond 1997, p. 284) . Two key aspects of societal complexity would be precisely the existence of a state and organized religion.
It is natural to think of a certain level of agricultural development as a pre-condition for the existence of states. As noted by McNeill (1982, p.7) , "Early civilizations existed by virtue of transfer of food from its producers to rulers and men of power who supported themselves, along with a following of military and artisan specialists, on the food so secured". One of the conditions used by anthropologists to distinguish states from chieftancies and other sub-state organizations is precisely the existence of a class of nonfood producing specialists (Flannery 1972) . States required the existence of agricultural surpluses, and increases in state complexity and power were only possible through an increase in agricultural production that would sustain a larger army and a more specialized class of bureaucrats and artisans.
Agricultural development may be not just a necessary condition for the emergence of states -under evolutionary arguments it may also be a su¢ cient one. Societies that were able to generate agricultural surpluses may or may not chose to form states and to sustain an army. Those that do so, however, will have an advantage in military operations and over time will absorb the societies choosing a di¤erent path. Evolutionary forces at the society level would thus ensure that states emerge wherever agricultural development make it possible.
An additional argument is the fact that low population density makes nation-building di¢ cult. Austin (2008 Austin ( , p. 1005 The …rst three columns of table 1 refer to the situation in the year 1500 AD. Economic development in the pre-industrial world of this time would be largely determined by agricultural technologies. We would thus expect Diamond's thesis to be in full force at this time, and biogeographic 2 2 Data on the agricultural transition is from Putterman (2008) , on slave exports from Nunn (2008) , on GDP per capita from the World Bank and the Penn World Tables, and on population density in 1500 AD from Chanda and Putterman (2007) . The present exercise complements and expands the analyses of Olsson and Hibbs (2005) and Putterman (2008) , who do not consider slave exports, and of Nunn (2008) , who limits his sample to Africa. endowments to exercise a powerful in ‡uence on population densities. That is indeed what we observe. Column 1 shows that an earlier transition to agriculture has a statistically signi…cant association with higher population densities. An extra thousand years since the transition is associated with a 43% increase in density and the variable explains 27% of the variation in the data. The results change in a revealing manner when we consider GDP per capita in the year 2000 AD. In column 4 we use the years since the agricultural transition as the only explanatory variable and …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect, but considerably weaker than previously. An extra thousand years of experience with agriculture is associated with an income per capita 15% higher, and the variable is able to explain just 7% of the variation in the data.
When we add the log of slave exports, as we do in columns 5 and 6, biogeographic endowments are no longer related to current economic development. It follows that, when it comes to present-day income per capita, these endowments are important only through their e¤ect on the magnitude of the slave trade. Slave exports have a strong negative relationship with economic development, and the size of the e¤ect falls by half but re-mains large and statistically signi…cant when we introduce a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa. The addition of these two variables greatly improves the …t of the regression, which now explains up to 37% of the data.
The interpretation of these results must be handled with care since they do not negate all role for geographic or climatic factors, particularly in Africa. As we understand them, these results indicate that the mechanisms emphasized by Jared Diamond were a major determinant of economic development around the year 1500 AD (and arguably at any time earlier), but no longer so by the year 2000. Thus, the biogeographic factors that made for an early agricultural transition are no longer a direct constraint on economic development. They may continue to exercise an indirect in ‡u-ence, however, because they determined the initial conditions under which the di¤erent regions of the world interacted. As we have argued above, for Africa this means a technological retard in manufacturing and the absence of states and large religions, which largely determined its path as a slave exporter.
In addition to that, geography may continue to constraint development through channels di¤erent than those emphasized by Diamond. This would be re ‡ected in the negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the African dummy. Geographic aspects such as Africa's low percentage of land near the coasts (and correspondingly large number of landlocked countries) had little or no relevance for an early agricultural transition but may be of great importance in today's world.
An illustrative model
Many aspects of the above discussion can be cast in the form of a simple mathematical model which may be useful to clarify some ideas. We consider a world economy with two regions, Africa and Europe, and leave aside the discussions concerning the other regions of Eurasia. Each regional economy has two sectors (agriculture and manufactures), may engage in slave production as a means to buy imports, and is subject to Malthusian forces.
Let us start with Africa. Agricultural production can be summarized by a standard aggregate production function of the form:
In (1) Y stands for total agricultural output, L for labour within agriculture and T for land ("terre"). A is total factor productivity within agriculture and will be assumed to depend on initial biogeographic conditions.
In what follows, T will be considered …xed and normalized to 1; so it can be omitted from the rest of our calculations.
Two types of agents inhabit this economy: farmers and non-food producers. Each farmer owns one unit of agricultural labor while each non-food producer owns one unit of non-agricultural labour and an equal share in all land rents. We assume that farmers are freely mobile within the agricultural sector but that they cannot migrate towards non-agricultural sectors. They would thus be paid the marginal product of their labor, that is:
In (2) w stands for the real wage and it's expressed in units of the agricultural product. This real wage is decreasing in total agricultural population because of the …xity of land.
We now add a Malthusian mechanism to the model by assuming that the total population working the land will increase whenever the real wage is above a certain "subsistence" level that we note as w: This implies that technological innovations (a higher value for A) will result in a higher real wage only in the short term; over the medium to long term population will expand and bring wages back to their initial level.
It follows that, except for short term departures, the real wage will be …xed at w and equation (2) can be used to determine the endogenous level of the farmer population, which we denote L :
As mentioned above, land rents belong to non-food producers. Their amount can be calculated as the di¤erence between total agricultural production and total labour income in agriculture:
Using (1) and (3) in equation (4) gives us the amount of land rents as a function of agricultural productivity and the real wage:
These rents are divided among non-food producers, whose number equal L nf , and give them a per capita agricultural rent of R=L nf : We will make use of the Malthusian mechanism once again and assume that these agricultural rents pin down the number of non-food producers in the same way as the real wage in agriculture determines the number of farmers. In other words, L nf will expand until R=L nf equals the subsistence wage w: This determines the number of non-food producers as
which, given (3), can also be written as:
All that is left is to specify the nature of production in the manufacturing sector. We describe it by a simple aggregate production function with constant returns to scale with respect to labor:
Equation (8) shows that manufacturing is in the hands of non-food producers, and each of them is able to transform their endowment of one unit of labor into A m units of manufacturing. The constant returns to scale capture the idea that, despite the short-term …xity of capital, over the long term basically all factors of production involved in manufacturing can be reproduced. Manufacturing is thus free of Malthusian pressures.
At this point most models would derive demand functions for agricultural and manufacturing products and confront them with the respective supplies in the market. The distribution of production inside the economy is not really the focus of the present exercise, so we will abstract from this step for the sake of simplicity. Instead, we assume that manufactures are consumed only by non-food producers, so that farmers are limited to agricultural consumption. It thus follows that the per capita consumption of agricultural products is w for both farmers and non-food producers while each non-food producer will consume A m units of manufacturing on top of that.
We have not yet discussed what determines A m , the technology used in manufactures. At the level of aggregation for which this model is intended (continents or civilizations), an assumption along the lines Kremer (1993) seems adequate: technology grows proportionally to the number of people available for creating new inventions. In the static framework presented above, the assumption can be introduced by assuming that A m is an increasing function either of L nf , the number of non-food producers, or of total population L + L nf (the two are proportional). In accordance with our previous discussions, the model posits a causal chain going from biogeographic factors to agricultural technology, from agricultural technology to total population and, …nally, from total population to manufacturing technology.
All of the above equations will also apply to Europe, with the sole di¤er-ence of a richer initial endowment in biogeographic factors. This, of course, would lead to higher technological levels in Europe at the moment when the two regions come into contact. Assume, in addition, that transport costs make agricultural products non tradeable.
In principle, the situation would not lead to any exchange between the regions since Africa cannot o¤er its agricultural products against European manufactures. We expand the model, however, by allowing non-food producers to engage into an alternative activity to the production of manufactures:
the capture and selling of slaves. Quite simply, each non-food producer may chose to invest his unit of labour into a "capture technology" yielding slaves. The slaves can then be sold in an international market for a price of P S units of manufactures per slave. It follows that non-food producers will chose to engage in slave production if the income from doing so, P S , is higher than the income from sticking to manufacturing, A m : 23
The …nal element of the model is the determination of P S : For this we may assume that slave buyers will employ their slaves in the production of manufactures. 24 A slave may produce manufactures using the production function given by equation (8), with the exception that their productivity would be lower than that of free labour. Thus, the per capita production of slaves is A m , where is a parameter between 0 and 1, and A m the level of manufacturing technology in Europe. Assuming that perfect competition on the side of slave buyers will erode any arbitrage gains, and abstracting from transport costs, this leads to a price per slave of P S = A m :
The model thus boils down the condition of whether Africa will become a slave exporter to a simple inequality. Africa would export slaves if
Equation (9) conveniently summarizes the two main aspects that made 2 3 It is natural to assume that slaves are taken from the farmer population, which leads to the question of what happens to agricultural production. We circumvent this minor issue by assuming that agricultural production takes place before slave capture.
2 4 This is a shortcut. Slaves would be employed in the production of a third type of good, say sugar, which would then be exchanged for manufactures using Europe's relative prices.
Africa the source of the world's slaves. First, the gap in manufacturing productivity between African and Europe -translated here as the di¤erence between A m and A m : Second, the low cost of acquiring slaves in Africatranslated here as a large number of slave captures per unit of time invested, : The presence of only one of these elements may not be enough to verify the inequality in (9), but Africa was characterized by both of them. Moreover, both A m and may be regarded as ultimately determined by biogeographic factors; in which case the condition would simply require that such factors are su¢ ciently less favorable in Africa than in Europe.
Concluding remarks
It is perhaps no exageration to say that Africa was transformed by the TransAtlantic slave trade of the early modern period. It was, at any rate, one of the most remarkable events in African and indeed world history. While that should be enough to attract the attention of social scientists in general, economists and economic historians may feel particularly concerned by its analysis due to its potential role in present-day economic outcomes.
Moreover, economics appears as the very …rst tool of analysis for a phenomenon in which gain and pro…ts were the raison d'être. It is from the perspective of di¤erences in productivity, and the arbitrage possibilities that they engendered, that we have chosen to approach the subject. The questions raised along the way, however, have required us to broaden the scope of the analysis to areas that -although not completely foreign to economics -do not constitute its bread and butter.
Low costs of acquiring slaves are central in understanding why only Africa specialized in slave production. And while a discussion of costs is a staple of freshmen's economics courses, the cost di¤erences that we discussed here are the outcome of cultural di¤erences. No economic rationale can be easily invoqued for explaining why a person may be regarded as an outsider, and thus liable to enslavement, by a certain group. Surely British slave traders would have found it pro…table to send the poorest and meanest of England to work as slaves in the Caribbean plantations. But motives stronger than the possibility of gain were at play in making that impossible.
The curious thing, however, is that by pushing the questions even further into the past we have advanced what appear to be long-term economic factors explaining those cultural motives. People feel a sense of common belonging through a shared national or religious identity, but the existence of states and organized religion is itself ultimately a product of economic forces.
These are not the economic forces of individual rationality and utility maximization, but forces that act at the level of societies or even continents and on a large historical scale.
The vision we end up with is, we believe, encouraging. Africa has been severely handicapped by its biogeography as long as economic production was mainly agricultural and cultural areas were limited in some way or another by agricultural surpluses. We have no reason to believe that Africans themselves are any less inventive or hard-working than other homo sapiens in the planet. In the new economic reality in which we live now the development of African nations should then be within the reach of the African people. be equated to the value of production per slave. The share of labour in production was about 0.5 (Table 3) and Eltis et al. (2005) assume that maintenance costs are about half the marginal productivity of labour. With a Cobb-Douglas production function the marginal productivity of labour equals the production per worker times the share of labour, or £ 3.4 per year, which gives a …gure of £ 1.7 per year per slave for maintenance costs.
Thus, inclusive of maintenance costs, a year of slave labor would cost £ 3.54 -or about a quarter of the market wage for agricultural labor in England.
